In wartime, logistics are vital, and during the historic Dien Bien Phu Campaign, wartime transport trucks played a crucial role. This article, based on original documents, delves into the organization and command of mechanized transport, highlighting the role of trucks in ensuring logistics and contributing to the great victory. We will explore how transport was considered a “combat order,” where each truck and driver was not only a transporter of goods but also a soldier on the logistics front.
In the early days of the campaign, the mechanized transport route faced many challenges, especially in loading and unloading goods and in commanding vehicles to avoid each other on treacherous mountain passes. These weaknesses not only slowed down transportation but also became targets for enemy attacks. Therefore, the organization and command of transport focused on solving these two “bottlenecks,” ensuring a smooth flow of logistics.
The loading area, which included warehouses, vehicles, and technical preparation activities, fuel replenishment, and logistical support, was considered the “launchpad” for transport troops. This was not only the starting point of each trip but also a place to boost morale and educate drivers on their mission before departure. Thoroughly resolving the loading and unloading of goods at this “launchpad” was key to improving transport efficiency.
Military truck transporting goods for the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, illustrating the crucial role of wartime transport trucks in ensuring logistics for the campaign.
To closely monitor and build the “launchpad” area, the transport line commander stipulated that the transport station’s command headquarters (equivalent to a regiment) must be stationed at the beginning of the route and place the command headquarters next to warehouses, parking lots, repair shops, and driver rest areas. This arrangement helped the commander grasp the situation directly, promptly issue instructions, and resolve arising problems, while also boosting the morale of soldiers. These areas were also organized with refreshment stalls, tea, cigarettes, and even entertainment programs, creating a cheerful atmosphere for soldiers before embarking on their arduous journey.
The presence of the transport station command headquarters in the warehouse area not only enhanced command capability but also had a positive psychological impact, encouraging the loading and unloading forces to release vehicles quickly. Commanders frequently visited the warehouse, observed, and issued instructions to overcome obstacles, creating motivation and a competitive spirit for both drivers and loading and unloading personnel.
In commanding vehicles on the route, experience from previous years shaped the organization of barrier stations. These stations were usually located at intersections, junctions, or at both ends of key mountain passes, one-way roads, fords, and ferries. Initially, barrier stations only regulated traffic, but during the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, with a seamless wired communication system, barrier stations became transport command stations on the road. Some stations were even upgraded to sub-command posts of the route, responsible for receiving vehicle reports, understanding the situation of each vehicle, transmitting orders from the command headquarters, adjusting the priority of goods, and changing items when necessary, such as unloading rice and taking urgent weapons or carrying severely wounded soldiers.
The position of traffic command stations became increasingly important, especially in commanding vehicles to overcome key points. The station coordinated with engineers to open more passing lanes on mountain passes, especially on long and treacherous passes like Pha Din Pass. Initially, Pha Din Pass, 30km long, had only two traffic command stations at both ends. Later, engineers and transport personnel surveyed and opened six more passing lanes, helping the convoy flow continuously, reducing waiting time.
To improve transport efficiency, the organization of communication played a key role. A communication system was established from the route command headquarters to the transport command stations on the road, the “launchpad,” and vehicle units, artillery, and engineers. This ensured that the command of mechanized transport was carried out in a timely manner, grasping the situation instantly at each point to handle it quickly. Although there were plans in advance, each specific situation required the commander to be flexible, using telephones or shortwave radios to issue orders, encourage, and guide subordinates.
During the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, for the first time in Son La, a nearly 100km wartime transport truck route was protected by a mobile 37mm anti-aircraft artillery battalion. This battalion was tasked with ambushing and intercepting enemy aircraft, shooting down several aircraft, including a B57 that crashed on the spot. This event increased morale and peace of mind for the entire route, especially for drivers, especially during early morning or late evening trips. All activities of the armed services were aimed at serving transport operations, optimizing the useful running time of wartime transport trucks.
During the Dien Bien Phu Dong Xuan (Winter-Spring) Campaign, dense fog covered the high passes. Transport commanders studied weather patterns and enemy aircraft activity to take advantage of opportunities for vehicles to cross key points. On the transport route, the saying circulated: “Go early in the afternoon, return at noon in the morning, drizzle all day,” reflecting the spirit of taking advantage of the weather for transportation. However, Dien Bien Phu weather sometimes “backfired.” One day, just as the sky was clearing up, vehicles took advantage of the opportunity to cross Pha Din, but the sun was scorching, and many convoys and anti-aircraft artillery encountered enemy aircraft in the middle of the treacherous pass.
Military truck in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, illustrating the hardship and danger faced by wartime transport trucks and soldiers.
The transport staff agency of the route always closely monitored to command the forces, ensuring that each driver and vehicle delivered goods to the front line as quickly and as much as possible. The organization of transport command was essentially the organization of combat command coordinating the armed services, ensuring that mechanized transport completed the central task of the transport route.
During the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, the staff agencies, transport stations, and “launchpad” were connected by a solid telephone information network, along with the construction of strong, compact, and light vehicle companies. These were valuable experiences in the organization of transport of the Dien Bien Phu Campaign.
Transport operations in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign achieved great success, especially the transport of wounded soldiers by motorized vehicles on long routes. With the motto “Fight and transport the wounded simultaneously, continuously, and regularly, combining the transport of the wounded and treatment along the way,” the General Department of Frontline Supply solved the difficult problem of transporting the wounded in the context of jungle warfare, far from the rear, and lacking local civilian medical facilities.
To transport the wounded regularly, a method of combining transport by car was applied on the principle of “loading rice when going up, transporting the wounded when returning,” due to the insufficient number of specialized Red Cross vehicles and the paramount importance of safety. By the end of June 1954, the wounded Dien Bien soldiers were resting in convalescent units and hospitals in the palm hill and tea forest areas. This was the largest achievement in transporting the wounded, mainly by motorized vehicles, in the shortest time compared to previous campaigns.
Content: NGUYỄN AN Presentation: NGỌC DIỆP Photos: Dien Bien Phu Historical Victory Museum, TTXVN
*(Article published in the book “*50 Years of Dien Bien Phu Victory: Dien Bien Phu – a collection of scientific works, National Political Publishing House Truth, 2005)
